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Abstract— Lobby groups exert strong influence on the 
formulation of public policies across all major democratic 
political systems. The more pluralist democracies, which are 
open to several competing interests, witness higher degree of 
interest groups functioning. Such ubiquity, however, is 
coupled with an increasing crisis in terms of declining public 
legitimacy, transparency and accountability. As a global 
practice, legal regulation is employed as the fundamental 
approach to bring the requisite transparency and legitimacy 
to the lobbying process. India, as a transitional political 
economy, witnesses substantive deterioration in its public 
sphere and legislative activity. Lobbying comes across as a 
taboo in debates around the workings of the Indian polity. 
The paper proposes recognition and regulation of lobbying as 
the next generation reform to revive the declining standards 
of policy debates.  
Keywords- Participatory Democracy; Interest Groups; 
Lobbying; Public Sphere; Transitional Political Economies; 
Corruption.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The Indian polity, formally constituted through its 
legislative institutions and practices, faces a crisis of 
deteriorating public legitimacy. Last two decades have been 
symptomatic of increasingly chaotic and wasteful 
tendencies in the form of floor disruptions, declining 
standards of debating, constructive participation and 
conduct of the legislators, etc (Kashyap 2000; National 
Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution 
2002). Such decline, however, has been conceptualized as 
an inevitable paradox of democratic evolution. B.L. 
Shankar and Valerian Rodrigues, in their recent book “The 
Indian Parliament- A Democracy at Work”, argue that the 
chaos and wastefulness is a necessary product of the 
progressive democratization of the Indian polity. Dr. 
Subhash Kashyap also flags this element of unavoidability, 
but he attributes it partly to the inherent complexities of 
modernization, reflected in globalization, “information 
explosion and technological revolution”, which have caused 
such institutional strains in the polity.  
Both the perspectives, however, agree that 
democratization has, overtime, significantly altered the 
composition of legislature membership. The era following 
the end of colonial rule populated the legislatures with elite 
intelligentsia, which was closely associated with the 
national freedom movement, exuding “national unity” and 
moral authority. The decade of ‘70s witnessed 
consolidation of interest groups, like peasants and workers. 
The qualitative nature of membership got further 
fragmented through the ‘90s (Shankar & Rodrigues 
2014). This was the phase of unstable coalition politics 
where both the government and the opposition, as groups, 
could only retain diluted authority, while individual 
members (‘politicians’) emerged as “a new caste” and “co-
sharers in the spoils” (Kashyap 2000). Coincidentally, this 
phase also initiated multiple fragmentation and emergence 
of new political parties, predominantly at the provincial 
level. Politics now increasingly seems to be a secure 
investment. It is, therefore, not surprising that political 
corruption- nepotism and quid pro quo tendencies- have 
been high on the agenda of law and policy reforms in the 
contemporary political discourse. 
Analogically, this transition is relatable to the 
democratization process in Latin America. The early stages 
of democratic transition from colonial rule or 
authoritarianism witnessed representation of a few 
established interest groups, like business, labour unions and 
agriculture, in the polity. A political arrangement 
conceptualized as the “corporatist state”, in the jargon of 
Political Science. Sustained democratic reforms and 
practices further fragmented such representation into 
several smaller and highly specialized factions- a transition 
from corporatist to pluralist polity (L.A. dos Santos 2012).  
A. The Logic of Continuous Reforms in a Democratic 
Polity 
Such characterization of the problem of collective 
enterprise, as a by-product of democratization, reminds of 
the classic Olsonian paradox of latent organizations 
(Mancur Olson 1965). The transition (or fragmentation) of 
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the legislature from being composed of a few interest 
groups (an oligopolistic enterprise) to a body of individual 
politicians or multiple political parties (a large latent 
organization) accentuates the structural and operational 
constraints. The process of deliberation and negotiation, in 
such latent organizations, becomes fragmented and chaotic; 
also the incentive (or motivation) to function as a collective 
dilutes below optimal for individual members with 
multifarious interests and objectives. 
However, even if one concedes the inevitable nature 
of such political decline as a necessary evil or an 
opportunity cost of reforming democratic institutions and 
processes, it does not escape the fact that such decline, in 
turn, compromises the very process of democratization. 
Like a Golem of Jewish folklore, it looms large on its very 
source or master, with the sole purpose of consuming or 
destroying its essence altogether. This counter-effect 
operates in two broad forms. Firstly, the inefficiency and 
wastefulness creates a general and systematic loss of public 
legitimacy and trust in political institutions. Secondly, it 
substantively drags and constrains further democratic 
reforms and good governance.  
The very product of our ‘tryst with democracy’, 
therefore, has also become a material cause for 
reinvigorating political reforms. The corrective measures, 
suggested in this context, range from quantitative 
improvements in the functioning of legislatures- working 
days, intensity of constructive legislative activity, intensity 
of committee meetings, frequency of adjournments etc.- to 
qualitative reforms- debating standards, agenda framing, 
salience of public policy issues, quality of legislation, 
supervision of the executive government, and improvement 
of public perception through mass media etc (Agnihotri 
2009).  
B. Limitations of Existing Reforms in Transitional 
Political Economies like India   
I argue that such an inward looking or self-referential 
reform agenda, though not unnecessary, is certainly 
inadequate for a polity like India, which is progressing 
towards the mature stage of democratic transition- reflected 
in its political institutions and practices. If transparency and 
accountability are integral elements of democratic reforms, 
the Right to Information Act, 2005 and the impending 
Lokpal (Ombudsman) legislation, to certain degree, mark 
the paradigm shift by ensuring micro-level participation of 
the citizenry in the realm of public policy and governance. 
Such measures, however, are predominantly reactive 
(individual complaint redress mechanisms). Therefore, 
while these reforms drive the political paraphernalia to a 
corrective and efficient policy path, such correction is 
severely limited by the inherent nature of these 
individualistic or micro-level reforms. 
As a mark of democratic maturity, India needs to 
engage with the best of International practices- across 
jurisdictions and international organizations. In this context, 
there exists a trilogy of such ‘sunshine’ reforms of 
transparency, which are built around the idea of 
participatory democracy. The drive initiated by the legal 
recognition of right to information and Ombudsman takes a 
paradigm leap with the third set of participatory reforms in 
the form of legal recognition and regulation of interest 
groups and lobbying activities. I further argue that in the 
context of developing economies like India, regulatory 
recognition of lobbying does not only offer a negative 
benefit of monitoring political corruption, it equally offers a 
substantive positive benefit in terms of better articulation of 
policy concerns and public debate through recognized and 
established mediums. It, therefore, offers dual contribution 
towards the paradigm of good governance. 
 
II. LOBBYING, INTEREST GROUPS AND 
REGULATION  
For most of the western democracies, governed by 
the capitalist economic philosophy, lobbying and interest 
groups participation has been entrenched themes of law and 
public policy since the latter half of the previous century. 
The United Kingdom is the latest of those established 
democracies to have formally incorporated lobbying within 
its regulatory framework. Till 2014, eleven jurisdictions 
have formally implemented the regulatory framework for 
lobbying activities within their legal system. They are the 
US, Canada, the EU, Germany, the UK, Australia, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Taiwan and Slovenia (Chari, 
Hogan & Murphy 2010). 
The regulatory conception of interest group 
lobbying, despite its operational variance across 
jurisdictions, partakes the “motivated communication of 
private interests to public authority” model prevalent in 
political science. Interests, in this context, are distinct from 
mere subjective preferences or feelings on a public policy 
issue. Lobbying interests, therefore, necessarily involve 
active interface of the private group with a governmental 
entity or public authority (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson & 
Salisbury 1993). 
According to these authors, interests are only created when 
private values come in contact with government. The profit 
motive, religious beliefs, desire for some public good, or opinions 
on a social issue, then, are not in themselves “interests”, but 
become so only when those who share them make demands on 
government. (Baumgartner & Leech 1998)  
A. The Influence/Exchange Model of Lobbying & 
Questions of Transparency  
Based upon the premise of policy engagement and 
participation, lobbying has been defined as “the 
stimulation and transmission of communication, by 
someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, 
directed to a governmental decision-maker with the hope 
of influencing his decision” (Milbarth 1963). This 
definition is comprehensive because it is not only operative 
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at different levels of governmental authority (local, 
national, regional and international) or different branches 
(legislative and executive), but also applicable to various 
actors, such as corporate lobbyist and citizen groups. Its 
essence lies in the attempt to influence and not necessarily 
in the realization of the final outcome, in terms of success 
or failure. Another core feature of lobbying lies in it being 
the act of private actors attempting to influence public 
actors. These “private actors” are conceived as extra-
institutional, i.e. an entity or person who is not, in doing 
so, exerting public authority or fulfilling a constitutional 
mandate (Venice Commission 2013). It further highlights 
the representational nature of participation- the extra-
institutional actors act on behalf of specific public 
constituencies. 
This model of lobbying raises certain fundamental 
questions of transparency and accountability on the part of 
the public authority, which is being purported to be 
influenced in the process. It is on this account that 
lobbying often generates negative public opinion on the 
questions of its legitimacy and desirability. This problem is 
reflected in the following account of a well-known 
professional lobbyist in the US. 
Folklore has it that the oldest profession is prostitution. I 
always thought it was lobbying. The serpent in the Garden of 
Eden talked Eve into trying the apple from the Tree of 
Knowledge by successfully portraying knowledge as a virtue 
rather than the vice that God had made it out to be. For his efforts, 
the serpent was punished by God by being forced from then on to 
crawl on his belly in the dust. To much of the public mind, 
lobbyists belong alongside the serpents (Lipsen & Lesher 1977).  
It is the overall specter of secrecy and “closed-door 
dealings” that undermines its public legitimacy. As with 
the profession of legal advocates, it is not so much their 
aims and objectives, rather the procedures or means they 
employ that give lobbying an element of notoriety and 
“bestseller appeal”. Apart from being seen as an (ab)use of 
power and influence, the transparency problem is closely 
related to its alternative conception as an exchange 
transaction between public authority and private interests- 
quid pro quo. By this logic, lobbying has the potentiality 
for wasteful rent seeking and distorted tariff and subsidy 
allocations (Gordon Tullock 2005).  
B. Corruption and Lobbying Regulation  
One of the popular perceptions about lobbying is 
that it only involves corporate and moneyed interests. Its 
morality is questioned on the ground that corporate 
lobbying involves profit-maximization at the cost of the 
underprivileged sections of the society, who lack a similar 
accessibility to power corridors. Since corruption is 
predominantly an economic vice, there seems to be a close 
nexus between the public perception of identifying 
lobbying solely with business interests (corporate sector in 
the economy) and equating lobbying with corruption.  
Corruption is heuristically defined as misuse of 
public authority for private gains. There are two primary 
reasons cited for higher incidences of corruption in any 
political economy (Montinola & Jackman 2002):  
 The lack or inadequacy of political and economic 
competition or alternatives, which is primarily 
caused in the earlier stages of economic 
development and democratic reforms;  
 Inadequate or lower levels of income and wages in 
public sector employment.  
Following reasons are provided for such causes of 
corruption:  
If constituents (lobbyists) can replace politicians, or clients 
can readily reapply for bureaucratic privileges from different 
officials, individual officials have fewer incentives to engage 
in corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978).  
If public officials are well paid, they will value their positions 
more highly and will have fewer incentives to jeopardize 
those positions by engaging in corrupt behaviour (Moninola 
& Jackman 2002).  
Further, democratic competition is promoted largely 
through transparency legislations or regulatory norms. In 
this regard, guaranteeing the twin freedoms of information 
and association is significant. It creates a surveillance 
mechanism over the discretionary powers of public 
officials. Also, electoral reforms to ensure free and fair 
elections coupled with fair equality of opportunity in 
holding public offices introduce rigour and uncertainty 
over ‘perpetuities of formal power’. Public officials can be 
replaced through established procedures, and they cannot 
promise long-term favours to private clients. 
Regulatory regimes on lobbying in developed 
economies primarily address such issues of transparency. 
Being in the advanced stages of economic and democratic 
indices, the predominant concerns of such regulations is 
disclosure of relevant information by the private interests 
and public authorities and transparency in the specific 
lobbying transactions. While there will be inter-
jurisdictional variance in specific details of the lobbying 
regulation, each such regulation is primarily informed by 
the broad vision of enthusing the policy process with a 
credible degree of transparency and public legitimacy.  
C. Regulatory Challenges 
There are certain conceptual challenges in the 
designing of regulatory framework for lobbying. Any 
political economy embarking upon such legislative 
enterprise will be confronted by “hard questions” of public 
law. It is so because a shift from questions of policy to 
legal regulation is an interface among politics, economics 
and positive law. Would the conceptual categories from the 
discipline of political science ipso facto accommodate 
themselves in a positively enforceable legal regulation? 
For instance, who should be the subjects of such 
regulation; which processes could be the objects of law; 
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what is the locus of public officials; what is the rigour of 
sanction regime; retrospective enforcement of legal rules; 
questions of jurisdiction and implementing authority (e.g. 
Multinational Entities like MNC’s or International NGOs) 
are only some of the pertinent questions in this context.  
Essentially public communications with Government, 
political system and the public service fall into three main 
categories (Ireland Reform Proposals 2012): 
 Day-to-day contact between individual citizens in a 
personal capacity and their local political 
representatives, constituency TD, Councilor or 
public servant in relation to any issues affecting 
them as individuals (i.e. such contact could range, 
for example, from personal administrative matters to 
representations the individual is making on 
international issues) or in relation to local issues 
which do not have a wider national or regional 
impact; 
 Contact between individuals representing 
organizations either in a remunerated capacity or as 
office holders in those bodies and office holders (i.e. 
ministers) or public servants in relation to matters 
concerning the objectives of the organization in 
which they are employed or hold office or on a 
wider sector or sectional interest; and  
 Interaction between individuals in professional 
lobbying organizations representing the interests of 
third party clients and political representatives, 
office holders or public servants.  
It is essential that normal local and constituency-
related interactions set out at (1) above should be 
unaffected by the proposals to regulate lobbying because 
(OECD 2010):  
Under no means should citizens who voluntarily and without 
compensation exercise their right to petition government, who 
communicate their viewpoints with elected and appointed 
representatives be subject to registration requirements or 
reporting or disclosure burdens. Any such imposition on 
average citizens is unnecessary, over-reaching and anathema 
to democracy.  
D. The Case of Transitional Political Economies  
While the previously articulated interface between 
corruption and lobbying regulation effectively explains the 
position of advanced western democracies, the study of 
developing and transitional political economies reveals 
supplemental paradigms to those of transparency rationale. 
Firstly, transitional economies generally experience 
significantly higher levels of corruption than the advanced 
economies (Transparency International 2014). 
Therefore, it is difficult to assume that the regulatory 
vision and purpose of such distinct political economies 
would bring out equally efficacious results in the long run. 
In other words, the regulatory structure and 
implementation in developing economies needs to exceed 
mere aim of transparency, which is more suited to the 
advanced economies. 
Advanced economies are successful in garnering 
substantive public legitimacy for their resource distribution 
and allocation policies because they have the fiscal 
capacity, in terms of tax and other forms of fiscal revenue. 
As a result they are able to pool in optimal resources to be 
adequately distributed among competing interest groups. 
Fiscal transfers to diverse clientele are, therefore, 
‘perceived’ to be transparent and justified. The case of 
transitional political economies is qualitatively distinct, in 
terms of their revenue base and mobilization. At any 
particular policy intervention, certain groups are often 
excluded by structural compulsions. This significantly 
contributes towards the lowering of public legitimacy in 
the resource mobilization and allocation policies of the 
government (Mushtaq Khan 2006). 
This is the classic paradox of transitional 
democracies: while long-term economic development, 
largely driven through private enterprises, is sine qua non 
for structural reduction in incidences of corruption and 
consequent harnessing of public trust and legitimacy; 
private business enterprises are perceived, in the short 
term, to have appropriated the policy domain by exuding 
undue influence over government through lobbying. The 
mass media outcry of democracy being reduced to the rule 
by elite economic minority (corporate interests) is a regular 
feature of public debates in such developing economies, 
including India. 
I, therefore, argue that such transitional democracies 
need to envision the remedial measures beyond mere 
enthusing of transparency principles; else the short-term 
trust deficit would create significant drags in the forward 
transition of these economies. This paradigm shift does not 
discount the merits of the transparency model. The latter is 
rather the starting point of the reform narrative. This 
supplemental conceptualization, therefore, builds upon the 
merits and gains of the transparency model. 
One conclusion, however, can definitely be drawn 
from this analysis: for India, the Right to Information Act 
and Ombudsman law can produce short-term, micro-level 
gains within the overall rationale of the transparency 
paradigm. But without the entrenchment of responsible 
lobbying and substantive policy participation, that 
accompanies it, India will certainly enter into the phase of 
paradox that plagues such transitional economies. Being 
witness to the nature of skewed public discourse on 
significant policy agendas, both in mass media and the 
legislatures, one can fairly presume that India has already 
entered into that zone of stagnation. It will be a serious 
obstacle to the realization of long-term maturity in both 
political as well as economic sphere.  
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III. A PROLOGUE TO PUBLIC SPHERE REFORMS 
Transitional economies need to continuously learn 
from the experiences of their more mature counterparts. 
They need to manifest stringent commitment towards 
adopting the best of international practices. While this 
certainly will be a common enterprise for the concerned 
political economy as a whole, involving all relevant 
stakeholders; yet the unique role and responsibility of the 
political authority (represented through formal institutions 
of legislature and government) must be realized for the 
movement to initiate in the first place. Political authority 
has the capacity to change conditions of mass inertia that 
often obstruct sector-specific reforms. For example in the 
Indian context, codification of customary personal laws 
governing conditions of marriage, divorce and inheritance; 
reforms in criminal law; changing customary practices 
through dowry prohibition legislation; land reforms against 
entrenched interests of the propertied class; transitioning 
from a closed economy to the neo-liberal globalization era 
etc. are some of the illustrations were formal political 
initiative led to subsequent alignment of the interest groups 
and masses in general. 
Surely, there are illustrations where such political 
initiative remained an unfinished enterprise because it failed 
to align the underlying practices in the long run, such as the 
problems of child labour, sexual offences, caste 
discriminations etc.  While there could be many reasons for 
the structural failure in these policy domains, yet one cannot 
still argue that the formal political initiative in the form of 
legislative or regulatory policy interventions was a bad 
start. May be something got lost in translation, but the 
inherent merits and suitability of formal political 
interventions cannot be undermined. It is in this context that 
I argue for a substantive legal recognition and regulation of 
interest group lobbying in India.   
A. An Alternative Conception of Lobbying 
Lobbying has been traditionally articulated as an 
enterprise of political exchange between private and public 
interests or a method of exuding power and influence, 
employed by the private interests, over formal public 
institutions and authority. In both these models, lobbying is 
seen as ‘outsider’s play’ that is solely interested in 
promoting its self-interest, even at any opportunity cost. 
The design of regulatory norms, and the consequent legal 
language, simply reproduces this alienated persona of 
lobbying interests. This has further reinforced the bad 
reputation and skewed skepticism of lobbying as a policy 
process. 
An alternative conception of lobbying substantively 
moves away from the understanding of policy domain as a 
locus of conflict, maneuvering and zero-sum game. It rather 
establishes interest group lobbying as the fourth pillar, 
which co-exists with mass media, of democracy, and a 
substantive index of democratic and economic maturity and 
health of a nation. Lobbying, in this framework, is 
conceptualized as a collaborative enterprise. It acts as a 
”service bureau”, a significant institution of assistance to 
the formal political authority (Hall & Deardorff 2006).  
I do not reject the models of exchange and influence 
altogether, for that would be bereft of the pragmatic 
truthfulness and salience of those models. I rather believe 
that exhausting the essence of lobbying with these models 
creates inadequate incentives (and also elicits knee-jerk 
response) for the political authority to intervene through 
regulatory mechanisms. Also I presume that such an 
alternative conception is perhaps the best buffer or hedge 
against the previously mentioned failures of regulatory 
interventions, which failed to align the public perception 
and practices over long run. 
European Union (EU) is one of the best sites to study 
the best practices in public policy and law. Its judiciary 
(ECHR) is perhaps the most effective international 
organization in terms of eliciting observance and general 
obedience from the municipal jurisdictions of its member 
countries. Even the UK, which has long cherished and still 
takes pride in its model of parliamentary sovereignty, has 
conceded significant space of authority to EU. The latter 
engages with lobbyists in a collaborative enterprise, where 
professional lobbyists supplement (and not substitute) the 
policy formulation process.  
.Expertise plays a central role in the deliberation, negotiations, 
and decision-making. The technical aspect, including technical 
expertise, disciplines the political bargaining in the specialized 
networks or sub-governments. It also provides a language and 
means of framing problems and their solutions, that is to 
structure the discourses and negotiations of policy... The 
concept of framing captures the deliberate definition of a 
particular issue and the particular context in which it should be 
understood (Burns & Carson 2002).  
B. Lobbying and the Public Sphere 
This constructive function of lobbyists is analogical to 
the mass media articulation of policy issues through news 
frames. The important distinction being that, in such an 
enabling system of government, lobbyists will always be 
significantly more proximate to the political dispensation 
than the mass media, because of the inherent nature of their 
roles. But we must remember that the advanced political 
economies maintain the vibrancy of public discourse by 
ensuring that there is always a substantive interface 
between lobbyists and mass media. It is so because mass 
media is the most appropriate source to engage with and 
inform the public at large. 
Governments employ various mechanisms and 
strategies to acquire information relevant to policy domains, 
ranging from statutory commissions to expert task force etc. 
Informational-lobbying, however, is an equally significant 
source of policy assistance to formal governmental 
institutions. Such informational lobbying might create 
winners and losers amongst specialized interest groups, but 
it is potentially beneficial to the overall interest of the 
political economy in the domains of public good, like 
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environmental concerns, public infrastructure, health, 
education etc. (Lagerlof 2004).  
Such constructive and necessary role of interest 
groups as source of relevant and complex information, or 
even the democratic requisite of a pluralist approach to 
public decision- making are often ignored as reasons to 
justify regulation. Instead, for example, the primary 
rationale of lobby regulation initiatives in Latin America is 
the need to tackle corruption and promote transparency in 
order to restore trust in the government and reliance in the 
political system (L.A. dos Santos 2012).  
It is for this reason that I categorize the former 
objectives and conceptualizations as the positive and 
proactive articulation of lobbying by public law, which 
acknowledges its inevitable role in resurrecting the public 
sphere in the transitional political economies; while the 
latter approach to regulation is centered around a negative 
and reactive conception of lobbying, wherein the only 
demand that the public sphere puts against lobbyists is that 
of ‘limited information disclosure’ to prove their 
legitimacy. While the former envisions lobbying as an 
integral part of public sphere, the latter authorizes public 
sphere as an inspector exercising surveillance over 
lobbyists. 
 
IV. INDIAN POLITY AND THE TABOO OF 
LOBBYING  
There is adequate circumstantial evidence to infer 
that “lobbying” is a taboo word in the Indian public sphere. 
On an impersonal note, the scant literature available 
around this forsaken reality clearly articulates the position 
that we as a democratic society need to cast out this 
undesirable phenomenon from our public life. One must 
not forget that western democracies, both Europe and 
America, have dedicated an entire century of research and 
legal interventions on the same subject, which to us seems 
to be quite futile. 
My personal engagement with the Indian academia, 
however, reveals the degree to which the latter understands 
this subject matter. During my doctoral course work, a 
professor of acclaimed international scholastic stature, who 
has substantively worked in certain sectors of civil rights 
advocacy, moderated one of the sessions. During the 
session, I spoke about the international regulatory 
practices, which for regulatory purposes do not make 
substantive distinctions between corporate-business 
lobbying and civil rights advocacy groups. The professor, 
in turn, refused to be designated by the word “lobbyist”. 
Similarly, during my pre-proposal interview, I was 
questioned about the significance of this project by one of 
the external examiners, who insisted that when bribery and 
quid pro quo are completely covered by the Indian 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, such an enterprise is 
futile. For him, “lobbying” was “bribery”. During the 
second stage of the interview, I was confronted by another 
professor-expert in Intellectual Property, who believed that 
lobbying is an all-US business; that it does not cover social 
action groups etc.; that, at best, any work on lobbying is 
intended to be a “bestseller” and not a “genuine research 
project”. These instances clearly reveal the degree of 
evaluation of lobbying that the Indian academia does at its 
end.  One can only imagine the extent of research that 
would be available in such a tabooed domain. 
In the context of India, the pathological conception of 
lobbying gathered populist momentum two years ago when 
recorded phone conversations of corporate lobbyist Nira 
Radia exposed her role in the 2G-spectrum controversy. 
More recently, with Walmart’s disclosure of its lobbying 
expenses in India, questions were raised about the 
strategies adopted by the corporate to enter the Indian 
market. Unfortunately, since lobbying activities were 
repeatedly identified in the context of corruption cases, 
they became synonymous with corruption and political 
scandals in the public consciousness. The only times we 
utter this word in public sphere are those when we are 
aggressively demanding an absolute ban over it, without 
having any clue as to what is the general nature, scope, 
significance and problem of the subject-matter.  
A. Literature Quality and Intensity  
There is no denying that lobbying as a politico-legal 
issue has a diminished presence in the Indian scholastic 
literature. Quantitatively, Economic and Political Weekly 
is perhaps the sole Indian journal to have around 3-4 
articles on lobbying. But they span over a period of 20 
years. The other sources are newspaper reporting’s in the 
aftermath of some quid pro quo scandals like Wal-Mart, 
2G-Spectrum Auction etc. These reports summarily equate 
lobbying with bribery. 
One article equates State-Union deliberation on 
resource allocation with political lobbying. It, therefore, 
argues that a skewed regional development and 
industrialization is the result of political lobbying, and that 
the latter undermines fiscal federalism (Biswas and Marjit 
2002). To construe an engagement within two public 
authorities in their official and Constitutional capacities as 
lobbying is conceptually flawed. Another article focuses on 
electoral reforms and highlights lobbying as a significant 
threat to free and fair elections in India (SR Sen 1994). 
Lobbying as a participatory process is primarily a post-
electoral phenomenon. Then, plethora of field research has 
established that election funding does not have a 
correlation with policy related lobbying success. 
Indian research space, in this context, is completely 
untouched by any official articulation from any of the 
public institutions. There are no policy papers, 
recommendations, draft proposals etc. It is surprising 
because many of the developing economies have already 
ventured into this area of public policy (Santos 2012). The 
introduction of a Private Member’s Bill in 2013 to 
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regulate lobbying was more in the nature of an individual 
leap of faith because with near zero background research, 
the Bill would be conceptually malnourished, as we shall 
see now.  
In defining “lobbying”, it commits an anomaly by 
necessitating payments to a public official as an integral 
component of the definition. It is a classic case of equating 
lobbying with corruption. Corruption is not regulated but 
proscribed. It imports the exact definition of “public 
servant” from the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
Again, empirical research has established that lobbying 
happens at the policy frame level, involving strategic 
public authorities like legislators, ministers, senior 
bureaucrats etc.  
A recent study on the emerging role of India’s 
corporate law firms’ influence over the policy and 
regulatory frameworks is perhaps the most realistic 
account of the activity of lobbying in the Indian context 
(Bhargavi Zaveri 2014). It highlights the phenomenon 
whereby the Indian corporate law firms are increasingly 
showcasing ’policy affairs’ in their suite of transactional 
and advisory services, thus following the footsteps of their 
American and British counterparts. Thus the current policy 
frameworks allow wide latitude for the corporate legal 
services sector to influence policy formulation, 
implementation and reform in India. The constantly 
evolving regulatory frameworks that seek to address the 
increasing complexities of the Indian economy are only 
going to propel a demand for expertise- oriented 
representation before the administration. As witnessed in 
the US, the emphasis on transparency will underpin this 
demand for representation in legal ways, in 
contradistinction to traditional methodologies of informal 
access.  
B. Regulation as a Prologue to Reform the Indian Polity  
Once lobbying is perceived as an integral feature of 
democracy, the role of regulation is not so optimal in 
exercising substantive control over lobbying. In such a 
context, the regulation is more like a device to harness 
public legitimacy (Lowenstein 1957). This is the initial 
stage role of such regulation because in recent and 
developing democracies, where a more hopeful approach 
could be expected, media and common sense always link 
lobbying with corruption or influence trafficking, setting a 
perception that special interests are inherently illegitimate 
(Thomas & Hrebenar 2008).  
One of the objectives of the regulation is to gain 
balanced perspectives on issues and lead to informed 
policy debate and formulation of effective policies, and 
allow all stakeholders, from the private sector and the 
public at large, fair and equitable access to participate in 
the development of public policies, that is crucial to protect 
the integrity of decisions and to safeguard the public 
interest by counterbalancing vocal vested interests (OECD 
2010, vide dos Santos 2012). 
Any regulation that respects [Latin American] local 
political culture must take into account, among other 
aspects, that lobbying is not appraised in the region as an 
inherent part of democracy. A public campaign to restore 
the image of lobbying must be launched. Indeed, lobbying 
must be controlled, not forbidden. It must be feasible for 
the public to distinguish the lobbyist who relies on 
corruption and influence trafficking and who 
professionally advocates private but legitimate interests, 
preserving the impartiality and autonomy of government 
(L.A. dos Santos 2012). This need for supportive action is 
equally true for India as we are dealing with almost a taboo 
theme.   
One of the most important potential gains from such 
regulation could be the eventual emergence and 
consolidation of a new profession. Professional lobbyists 
across the globe clearly owe their present stature to the 
humble beginnings of their legal recognition through 
regulatory instruments. It led to progressive 
institutionalization, training and certification of lobbyist, 
on the similar pattern as any other white-collar profession 
(Susman 2006). It, therefore, brings lobbying in the 
mainstream of public sphere as a recognized and accepted 
profession with certain social purpose. 
A related advantage of the institutional 
professionalism would its direct interface with the 
international best practices. The UN Reporting on 
Responsible Lobbying 2005 models the behavioral and 
normative concerns of responsible engagement of business 
lobbyists in public sphere:  
For companies and non-business organizations... they also 
[need the] understanding that their relationship with 
government not only concerns influencing particular policies; 
it also involves help developing the capacity of governments 
to deliver these policies. This will require them to: (i) work 
with countries to formulate policy, by for example lobbying 
for better regulation; (ii) push governments to fulfill aid and 
other commitments; (iii) build the capacity of public 
institutions to implement policy; and (iv) encourage 
governments to nurture enterprise development and capacity, 
such as the Growing Sustainable Business Initiative.  
C. Academic and Research Fraternity’s Impending 
Enterprise  
The western democracies, at the advanced stage of 
their economic and democratic experience, invested the 
past century on studying interest groups as the principal 
unit of political participation. Even the transitional 
economies of Latin America have initiated the research 
enterprise to engage in a critical study of lobbying. In this 
context, when I encounter the brilliant work of 
Baumgartner et al. where they attempt a critical review of 
the entire literature on interest groups spanning over 100 
years of the US political history, I can fairly gauge the 
sheer enormity of the task. I realize that my individual 
efforts could count for nothing when a parallel universe 
employs the entire clan of scholars for the same task. 
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Through this paper, I reach out to my fellow researchers 
from India and South Asia to evaluate the effectiveness of 
this enterprise and embark upon the requisite path. 
As a part of the prologue, I offer the perspective of 
Baumgartner et al. on the state of research on interest 
groups and its future scope. They observe that the research 
in this area has completed one full cycle in the last half 
century. While interest group research was the 
predominant scholastic enterprise in political science and 
public policy till 1980’s, it now lies at the periphery, as the 
research on formal institutions of government is back on 
agenda. 
They further divide the field into areas of advanced 
research (at a mature stage) and areas of avoided research 
(inadequate scholarship). While intra-group dynamics of 
membership nature, incentives, funding, patronage etc. are 
themes that have already reached at a mature stage of 
research; issues like lobbying and governmental 
engagement suffer from a balkanization of research, 
wherein small and unrelated research, mainly in the form 
of highly focused case studies, is the general norm. Latter 
types of studies suffer from two problems: technical 
problem of too small empirical design; and conceptual 
problem of a-contextual and isolated piece-meal nature of 
research. 
They finally highlight the collective nature of the 
enterprise by referring to the most significant empirical 
research on lobbying carried out by Heinz et al in 1993. It 
was a macro project funded by two of the most significant 
professional interest groups: the American Bar Association 
(ABA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), 
without whose support it would be impossible to carry out 
such research. I share this account because it flags certain 
structural concerns for research enterprises, provided we 
are ready to initiate. But are we? 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
In recent years there has been an increase in the 
number and spending on lobbying. Data reveals around 
12398 active and registered lobbyists in the US. The total 
costs of lobbying increased from $1.56 billion in 2000 to 
$3.30 billion in 2012- a 100% increase over a decade 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2013).
 
Rise of pressure 
groups, relative decline of corporatism and emergence of 
alternative non-corporate interest groups, and increasing 
public awareness are some of the factors for increase in 
lobbying as a professional activity (Rowbottom 2010).
 
This increase in lobbying activity is being accompanied by 
a decline in its public legitimacy. A study conducted by the 
OECD in 2012 reveals that 90% of the lobbyists in OECD 
countries acknowledge the negative reputation of their 
profession; 76% agree upon the need for transparency and 
accountability framework, but only 26% were in favour of 
governmental regulations (OECD 2010). 
In terms of scale of involvement, it is well 
established that, in all democratic political systems, lobby 
groups exert a strong influence when public policy is 
formulated and political decisions are made (Baumgartner 
et al. 2009).
 
The size and number of lobby groups that are 
active in any political system will vary according to 
countries. Their presence and role today in all political 
systems has become ubiquitous. One would expect that the 
more pluralist democracies, which are open to several 
competing interests, having the opportunity to influence 
policy-making, would see relatively more interest groups 
functioning than those political systems which have been 
traditionally defined as corporatists (Chari et al. 2010).  
The 2014 general elections to constitute the 16 th Lok 
Sabha
 
were immense on various evaluation criteria, 
participation of voters being prominent among them. It 
witnessed, at 66.4 percent, the highest ever voter turn out 
in the Indian electoral history. Compared to the 2009 
elections, the 2014 turnout had increased by eight 
percentage points- the highest ever between two successive 
parliamentary elections. It was marked by a significantly 
increased participation of women and urban voters.
 
The 
participatory facet was coupled by governance as the pre-
dominant electoral agenda, both for the voters and the 
political entities. Various field surveys delineated 
economic growth, corruption in public services, and 
consumer price inflation as occupying 70-85 percent of the 
electoral agenda (The Hindu; The Indian Express).
 
This participation-governance theme has been 
extended as the core functioning principle of the newly 
constituted Central Government. A fleeting survey of the 
prevalent agenda setting by various media sources, 
academia, business associations, citizens’ groups, and even 
the government itself reflects this finding. While 
commentators transcend significantly from this theme to 
articulate the challenges of socio-welfare rights, civil 
liberties, and minority welfare for the new government, an 
equally significant section has identified the participatory 
governance theme as the core mandate.  
However, as highlighted in this paper, there is a 
general agreement that the Indian public sphere of debate 
and deliberation is swiftly deteriorating. The declining 
standards of legislative proceedings and mass media’s 
agenda framing reflect the intensity of the problem. The 
recent policy debates on issues like foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in retail business, Land Acquisition 
(Amendment) Bill etc. were marked by homogeneity of 
interest representation across mass media. The business 
and corporate sector has clearly withdrawn from the public 
sphere since quite some time now (perhaps with the setting 
in of the neo-liberal reforms in the ‘90’s; it would be an 
interesting research study to further analyze this 
phenomenon). The debates are lopsided with the same 
interests creating repetitive loop of the issues that concern 
them.  
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To be fair to the corporate sector, and being critical 
of the liberals, speaking about economic benefits and 
profits in contemporary times, has become a taboo. The 
distinction between “profit-making” and “profiteering” has 
collapsed in the Indian public discourse. While the liberal 
academia and university community takes immense pride 
in nourishing the culture of dissent and diversity, sadly in 
our times it has been reduced to skewing the policy debates 
in a unidirectional framework. “Dissent and diversity” has 
been equated with “diversity of dissent” against specific 
policy agendas with absolute suppression of alternate 
discourse. Indian academia manifests a particularly curious 
case, especially the university fora in India. Indian 
academia, as a white-collar profession, has been a clear 
beneficiary of neo-liberalism, in terms of rising perks and 
global penetration. In such a scenario, while it is logically 
possible for the community to still take the position of an 
ethical watchdog over the excesses of neo-liberalism, yet 
over these years it seems, that the liberal academic 
community has lost the sense of perspective. 
Contemporary academia and university scholarship reflects 
not so much a position of ethical evaluation for neo-
liberalism; rather it is plagued by the problem of perceptual 
blindness in lacking a holistic approach towards the public 
sphere discourse on policy paradigms. Such a degeneration 
of public discourse will eventually harm all the 
stakeholders in the long run, also binding India’s overall 
transition towards becoming a mature political economy. 
Its effects on the quality of legislative and governmental 
activity are out for all to lament. It is time that we start 
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